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J. P. Stern,TheDearPurchcue: A The1JU! in German Modernism, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995.
The catastrophic political history of the German-speaking area in the flfst half of the
twentieth century contrasts oddly with the high quality of its literary and cultural
achievements. Was there some connection between 'the mind of Germany' and the
affrrmation of violence which produced not only the Nazi regime but also the German
and Austrian involvement in the brutality of the Great War? Enthusiastic advocates
of 'the mind ofGermany' hypothesis traced antidemocratic and authoritarian traditions
back to the medieval empire, Luther and the German Romantics, indeed even as far
back as German resistance to Roman colonisation and the Germanic invasions of
Roman territory.
The late J. P. Stem presents here a subtler view of the affmities between political
and literary developments in the early twentieth century. Stern (1920-1991) escaped
from Nazi-occupied Bohemia in August 1939, served in the Allied air force and
became one of Britain's most distinguished Germanists.
The theme of the book relates to its rather curious title, taken from a sonnet of
1663 by Andreas Gryphius. In Gryphius' poem Christian salvation is not 'dearly
purchased' because the comfort and salvation which Christ gives is 'freely given' to
those willing to accept it Stem contrasts this with the situation of the modern German
intellectual who looks for a different kind of salvation or validation of existence, but
believes it can only be obtained--if at.all-at exorbitant cost.
The writers whose individual works are analysed in The Dear Purchase are
Oswald Spengler, Thomas Mann, Robert Musil, Ernst Jiinger, Hans Carossa, Stefan
George, Georg Trak!, Rainer Maria Rilke, Gottfried Benn, Bertolt Brecht. Hermann
Hesse and Franz Kafka. These writers all had some experience of the world of 'old
Europe' before the catastrophes of the twentieth century and most of them experienced
and wrote about Nazi Germany. Considering Stem's Jewish ancestry, forced emigration
and Czech background (close members of his family were victims of the Naiis), it is
not surprising that his favourite authors are Mann, Rilke, Brecht and particularly
Kafka. Nevertheless, he judges authors primarily by literary and moral quality, not
by their political stance and mistakes; thus Spengler and Jilnger are seen as substantial
and important figures, and Stefan George as one of the fmest lyrical voices of modem
Germany in spite of the absurdities of Der Krieg, a poem which Stem discusses as an
example of German reaction to the Great War. The 'highmindedness' and alleged
'humanity' of Carossa, a doctor who wrote of his experiences in the Romanian
theatre of the war, is dismissed by Stem as 'consolation often only just short of
sentimentality, harmony not readily distinguishable from conformism, a sense of
goodness not shallow but untested by evil'.
Stem might be considered politically incorrect in omitting female writers from
consideration-only Else Lasker-Schiller is mentioned in passing as a mistress of
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Gottfried Benn. The reason why women writers of the era do not appear could be that
Stem's theme-the frenzied search for meaning and salvation at all costs-is perhaps
a male preoccupation. Certainly the majority of the writers in Stern's book gave this
theme priority over the depiction of relationships between men and women. It is also
striking in many fiction writers of the period that 'plol' (which usually involves
relationships between characters) is oft en sacrificed to philosophising (Stem notes
this in Mann, Musil and Hesse).
Stem is the author of a 1979 book on Nietzsche, whom he sees as influential but
greatly misunderstood by early twentieth-German writers. Stern's conclusion about
Nietzsche's political influence at that time was: 'just as the practices of National
Socialism were unthinkable without its ideology, so that ideology and its reception
were unthinkable without the influence of Nietzsche' (page l3).In The Dear Purchase
Stem modifies his position on the influences of literary figures on political events:
Nietzsche's thinking was absorbed into Nazi ideology only after "his brilliant reflective
insights were frozen into political cliches and slogans-a labour of crude vulgarisation
undertaken by two generations of university professors, litterateurs and plain hacks,
from the end of the Wilhelmine Reich through the Weimar Republic to the Hitler era'
(page 15).
It should be obvious that the direct influence of the literary elite on political
events is quite minor, given the comparatively small circulation of their works. But in
an age dominated by ideologies there is clearly some connection between these
ideologies and the ideas expressed by writers sensitive to the concerns of their society.
An ideologue like Hitler is successful if he responds to the consensus of values held
by the community. Stem investigates not so much the direct influence of the writers
on politics as this consensus, the common ground between them and the broader
German and Austrian community.
One such common belief in this period was in a uniquely German mission and
identity, distinguishing German-speaking people from their European neighbours.
Much effort was expended on this futile theme by German writers, from racist
journalists to sophisticated thinkers like Thomas Mann and Robert Musil. Stem says
that before 1945 'most of Germany's greatest minds saw their country as the exception
among the countries of Europe, and were intent on stressing and augmenting all that
divided her from the rest of Europe' (page 368). Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain
and his Reflections of an Unpolitical Man put forward the picture of 'the mind of
Germany' as essentially different from the rest of Europe. Stern agrees with this to
the extent that the German intellectual tradition emphasised theory and speculation
and downplayed political and social practicalities. In one of the most interesting
chapters in his book he examines the extensive use of the word 'reality' in the writers
of the era. 'Reality', paradoxically, is not the real world, but some better inner or
other world, not in a Christian sense although the origin of the idea in Christianity is
obvious. 'Reality' may be the privileged creative moment for the artist, but more
generally 'it is a state of mind supremely hard to attain, the fruit of a paramount
existential quest, often involving the sacrifice of the endeavouring self and its world'
(page 69). The consequence of this pervading attitude is a contempt for everyday
matters and for a commonsense approach to life in general. Stem says that 1945 is a
watershed in German intellectual history because 'in the period after 1918 people
still believed in, and acted on, systematised tenets and convictions to a degree
mercifully unparalleled in the Germany that began to arise from the ruins' (page
368). Postwar authors like Heinrich Boll, GUnter Grass and Siegfried Lenz are
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examples of the shift away from grand theories towards more mundane concerns.
The majority of the writers discussed in Stem's book leaned towards a conservative
outlook but had no direct contact with the politics of the day. The works of Spengler
.and JUnger, to some extent the poems of George and Rilke, were looked on with
favour by the Nazi regime, Benn had a brief flirtation with Nazi cultural politics,
books by Carossa and Hesse appeared under the Nazis-but these authors were not
suitable material for the propaganda machine. Trald, Kafka and Rilke died years
before the Nazis came to power, George in 1933 in Switzerland. lbomas Mann and
Robert Musil lived in exile after the Nazi takeover. The only truly politically active
writer treated in Stem 's book is Bertolt Brecht. In the analysis of Brecht's work
Stem shows Brecht's essential affinity with the concept of 'the dear purchase', and
indeed with the atmosphere in which intellectuals could accept a totalitarian system
as 'a haven of authenticity' .
Certainly, Stem says, Brecht is the odd man out in this company, but like the
others he sees the early twentieth century as an era searching for meaning and salvation.
The Marxist vision sees the mirage of a future society as a better and more authentic
'reality' than the contemporary world. This reality has to be 'dearly purchased' by
pain, sacrifice and the denial of humanity and compassion on the difficult road
towards it. This is emphasised in Brecht's Mother Courage and her Children:: each
of the children is destroyed by what are considered traditionally virtues, because in
the pre-Communist world the virtues cannot be exercised without danger to their
possessors. Only in the future will humanity and compassion be possible; to achieve
the better reality, what is morally good is ruthless dedication to the Communist
cause. As Stem points out, this is not so far from JUnger's idea of the value of
sacrifice and suffering to create the new steel-hardened man who can master the
problems of the twentieth century.
The Dear Purchase, apart from its central theme, shows Stern's great strength in
the analysis of literary works. Unlike the authors he writes about, Stem is not interested
in establishing an all-encompassing theory of life and literature. Critical activity, he
says, must preserve something of the mystery of good literature, and it must recognise
'that there is no such thing as an invariable method of analysis and criticism, and no
universal critical theory either' .
Michael Nelson
Harold Bloom: The Wedern Canon: The Books and School of the Ages,
Harcourt Brace: New York, 1994.
The Western Canon is rich in irony. The very term, 'the Canon', when applied to
English literature (as Bloom principally applies it) is ironical. For the word properly
belongs to the canon of Holy Scripture-those books of the Old and New Testaments
which have been accepted by the councils of the Church as authoritative, and which
are distinguished from, for example, the Apocrypha.
There is no such thing as 'the Western Canon' in literature. There have been
curricula dominated by certain writers in the short period of a century or so in which
English Literature has been an academic study. T. S. Eliot, as Bloom points out,
established a kind of canon, through his literary criticism, in the years when Bloom
was an undergraduate, fifty years ago. But Bloom both rejects Eliot's canon and Eliot
himself as a major component in it, while allowing that he is a 'strong' American
poet of comparable status to Wallace Stevens.
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An ironic footnote to Bloom's repudiation of Eliot is that (perhaps unconsciously-
and, if so, this adds to the irony) his prose is punctuated by phrases from Eliot's
poetry. This is an example of the potency of the influence of 'strong' writers, which
is identified by Bloom (here and in his earlier study, The Anxiety of Influence) as a
test of canonicity.
Another of the ironies of this work is Bloom's touchstone of canonicity. Whereas
in Christian tradition, it is defined by conformity to principles of orthodoxy, in
literature it is strangeness, innovativeness, eccentricity-heterodoxy.
Then, there is Bloom's unashamed espousal of elitism in his advocacy of the
refined abilities of the elect who are capable of literary study and appreciation:
only a few handfuls of students now enter Yale with an authentic passion for
reading. You cannot teach someone to love great poetry if they come to you
without such love.
Yet this unashamed elitist was the son of a 'gannent-worker', while those who would
deconstruct the Canon in the name of socio-political reform are 'intellectuals spawned
by the French upper middle class'. Their similarly privileged clones are upholstered
Marxists, champagne Socialists. A 'silly song of Shakespeare's has done more for
the poor and the wicked than all the Marxists and Feminists in the world':
one glories in the name of elitist. U elitism means believing that some poets are
better than other poets ... if elitism means that Shakespeare is of an entirely
different order from a pair of boots or a frying pan, then one is an elitist. What else
is there to be?
In the 'Preface and Prelude' and 'Elegy for the Canon' with which Bloom begins his
book, he pillories the modern university, in particular its Humanities Faculty (the
'School of Resentment' with six departments: 'Feminists, Marxists, Lacanians, New
Historicists, Deconstructionists, Semioticians') for unleashing, in Yeats' phrase, "mere
anarchy" ... upon what used to be called "the learned world"'. The 'current squalors'
of the academy would even dislodge Shakespeare, 'the central figure of the Western
canon', who 'sets the standard and the limits ofliterature', notably in King Lear ('the
center of centers of canonical excellence'). Shakespeare criticism
is in full flight from his aesthetic supremacy and works at reducing him to the
'social energies' of the English Renaissance.
This springs from the desire of the 'idealistic resenters' who throng our educational
institutions to 'overthrow the Canon in order to advance their supposed (and
nonexistent) programs for social change'. All aesthetic and most intellectual standards
have been abandoned in the name of 'social harmony and the remedying of historical
injustice'. 'Velvet totalitarianism' (as defined by John Furedy) has been promoted by
professors of hip-hop; by clones of Gallic-Germanic theory; by ideologues of
gender and of various sexual persuasions; by multiculturalists unlimited.
Bloom especially identifies 'feminist cheerleaders' who would replace Shakespeare
with women and African, Hispanic or Asian writers 'who offer little but the resentment
they have developed as part of their sense of identity'. 1bey would prefer Uncle
Tom's Cabin to King Lear. sixteen of the twenty members of the English graduate
faculty at venerable Princeton list 'gender studies' as their specialty. The 'degeneracy
ofliterary study' which this has produced, in Bloom's view, leaves him feeling 'quite
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alone these days in defending the autonomy of the aesthetic' .
He is probably not as alone as he imagines. In Slip-shod Sibyls, Germaine Greer
(now in a state of advanced retro-feminism) argues that feminists are promoting the
second-rate poetry of women in order to establish an alternative canon of 'She poetry'
at all costs, not in the interests of literature (who would be interested in that?), but to
redress the gender imbalance of the canon. And the women's publishing house,
Virago, is up for sale, its joint managing director having resigned after a new publishing
decision approved the publication of books by men; while Erica long has reflected
that
it's sad to see students racing toward the ethnic cleansing of the curriculum under
the guise of fairness and multiculturalism. It's still worse to see feminism made
an excuse for know-nothingism.
But Bloom's despair about Departments of English is complete:
there is no way ofgetting rid of the bureaucrats ofresentment, who are ensconced
everywhere, squatting like so many Satanic toads. This is something that calls for
the talents ofSwift. One would have to write a new Tale of a Tub. No, you cannot
clean these stables. It's over.
For the 'new commissars' ofmulticulturalism-that egregious contradiction in terms-
'reading good books is bad for the character'. Bloom agrees, but sees this as a
recommendation: 'Art is perfectly useless, according to the sublime Oscar Wilde,
who was right about everything'. Such convictions will only survive, in the future, in
English and other literature departments that have shrunk 'to the dimensions of our
current Classics departments': 'ceding their grosser functions to the legions of Cultural
Studies'. This is not a development we should deplore:
We need to teach more selectively, searching for the few who have the capacity
to become highly individual readers and writers. The others who are amenable to
a politicized curriculum, can be abandoned to it.
In the meantime, the best students are abandoning us, and 'are justified in doing so'.
For multiculturalism, 'anti-intellectual and anti-literary', is devoted to removing from
the curriculum 'most works that present imaginative and cognitive difficulties, which
means most of the canonical books.... '
The counter-canon of ideologically acceptable texts (such as those by Virginia
Woolf, whose 'immense literary culture shares little with the current crusade mounted
in her name') is a 'program for social salvation', but 'to read in the service of any
ideology is not... to read at all'. A case in point is the (mis)appropriation of Emily
Dickinson by the feminists who have (mis)read her to support their gender agenda.
Such 'reading'-the 'death of the serious study of literature as literature'-
deconstructs text, author and reader in the name of 'social selflessness'. Yet
Shakespeare wrote tbirty-eight plays, twenty-four of them masterpieces, but
social energy has never written a single scene. The death of the author is a trope,
and a rather pernicious one; the life of the author is a quantifiable entity.
Warming to this theme, Bloom dismisses Foucault, Barlhes and 'many clones after
them', who themselves would dismiss 'all of the dead, white European males'.
Or, more precisely, we cease to think in artistic and aesthetic terms, replacing
those priorities with socia-economic considerations:
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In contemporary America, the polemic shifts to a Shakespeare utilized as a
Eurocentric centre of power in order to oppose the legitimate cultural aspirations
of various minorities, including academic Feminists, who are now scarcely a
minority.
If Shakespeare is the most important creative writer, Samuel Johnson is, for Bloom,
the canonical critic:
More than any other critic, Johnson demonstrates that the only method is the self,
and that criticism is therefore a branch ofwisdom literature. It is not a political or
social science or a cult of gender and racial cheerleading, its present fate in
Western universities.
'Remorseless Puritans' have replaced Dr Johnson. For them, 'the beautiful in literature
is only another version of the cosmetics industry'.
An 'eminent critic' attempted to re-educate Bloom, telling him that 'reading
without a constructive social purpose was unethical'. He was told to immerse himself
in the writing of Abdul Jan Mohammed, a leader of the Birmingham (England)
school ofcultural materialism. As an addict who will read anything, I obeyed, but
I am not saved.
He is more sanguine about the resilience of the visual arts: Matisse will survive the
'daubings of the Guerilla Girls'. But here he may be too optimistic. Some months
ago, paintings from the Queen's Collection were sent to Australia for display at the
National Gallery in Canberra. ABC-lV made a documentary about the exhibition
and interviewed a range of people, from the Director of the Gallery to men and
women in the street, eliciting their responses to these masterpieces. All waxed lyrical,
except one. This individual was described as an 'academic'. So far from admiring
Rembrandt and the other masters, he dismissed the exhibition as a display of 'power'.
These were big paintings, he observed, deliberately produced to fill up big buildings-
palaces and so forth-in order that the powerful might oppress their subjects. He had
not a word to say about the artistry of the works-the extraordinary human
accomplishment they embody-or the delight and inspiration which they have given
(and continue to give) to generations of human beings, even the politically oppressed.
He was incapable of looking at a painting as a painting. One is waiting to hear such a
person say that Rembrandt is a disreputable role model as his dexterity with a brush
oppresses those who are less dexterous, and especially the manually challenged.
It should not be supposed, however, that The Western Canon is just an exercise
in negative defensiveness. It is to be distinguished, in this regard, from Alan Bloom's
The Closing of the American Mind. Harold Bloom, on the contrary, devotes some
twenty chapters to stimulating discussion of his canonical authors and closes with a
reading list, from the Epic of Gilgamesh to a 'canonical prophecy' of dozens of
contemporary writers. It would take three or four lifetimes of dedicated reading to
complete this syllabus and, of course, for Bloom real reading only begins with multiple
re-readings of a text. That his 'canon' should be so inclusive is the final irony of the
work.
Several critics (such as Peter Conrad) have justifiably criticised this book for its
subjectivity. I would comment on two less momentous faults. First, Bloom-for all
his understandable lampoon of the enemies within the gates in the universities-<1oes
not pay sufficient tribute to the universities for preserving such teaching of canonical
texts as survives. I never cease to be amazed, in my own case, that I am still able to
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conduct classes on the works of Donne, Milton, T. S. Eliot and Yeats, and other
grossly politically incorrect dead white European males, and that, in spite of all the
ideological propaganda of the totalitarian thought-police, students, in respectable
numbers, continue to choose the courses in which these reprobates are the authors of
the principal texts. Secondly, only once does Bloom refer to what is a very important
source of our problem in English studies today-the schools. He glances at the
'debasement of early education'. But this, more than anything else, is endangering
the future of English as an academic discipline. If we want to know why students
come up to the university unable to read and so preposterously ignorant of literary
history (indeed, of history) and so ignorant of the workings of language, of what an
essay might be, and subliterate in spelling and grammar, then it is to the schools and
their scandalous failure to empower their students, who are in their hands for twelve
years, with the knowledge and love of language and literature, that we should go.
This, more than the ideologues within the academy, is the real cause of the death of
literary studies in the modern university. Were the students well equipped at school
they would not be so susceptible to the mind-narrowing theories of the commissars of
the School of Resentment.
Barry Spurr
Robert Dixon, Writing the Colonial Adventure: Race, gender and nation in
Anglo-Australian popular fiction, 1875·1914, Cambridge University Press,
1995.
Robert Dixon argues that this study, which draws on the writings of Rolf Boldrewood
(1bomas Alexander Browne), Robert Russell, Rosa Praed, Ernest Favenc, Alexander
Macdonald, David Hennessy, Louis Becke, Fergus Hume and Guy Booth (amongst
others), stands at the convergence of three developments in Australian literature and
cultural history: a growing interest in late nineteenth-century Australian literature, a
convergence of Australian and post-colonial studies, and the role of cultural studies
in focussing on popular literature (and culture). Certainly, he is concerned to ask
what he considers are new questions, to strike out in what he argues are different
directions. He is less interested in Australian literary works that belonged within a
realist/nationalist tradition than with those that fitted into the international genre of
popular romance. At the same time he is more concerned with the intricacies of these
texts/novels/stories, in unveiling the complexities and contradictions of the values
that underpinned them, than with judging them in aesthetic terms.
The book contains two main and closely interwoven themes. First, Dixon is
concerned with the relationship of Australian ripping yams to their English
counterparts, to show how Australian writers of romance were influenced by Scott,
Haggard and Stevenson, but also reworked the genre to fit local needs, values and
conditions. Second, he seeks to demonstrate the complexities and contradictions of
the ripping yam genre. For example many of tbe Australian stories borrowed both
from the imperial ideologies of English romance and the nationalist realism of the
Bulletin school. Boldrewood sought to counterpose an idealised, static, hierarchical
and rural English against a fluid, rabble dominated Australian society but he could
not hide his admiration for the antipodes as a site of freedom and opportunity. In
some novels too Australia is presented as a place which endangers English identity
and culture, which can produce savagism and even cannibalism. Yet it is also
represented as the home of the Coming Man, a set of colonies where the English
138
Reviews
'race', corrupted by urbanisation and industrialisation may find regeneration.
This is an important book. Dixon has recovered a significant body of literature
and convincingly demonstrated its complex relationship both to local and international
culture. Yet I don't think this study is quite as innovative as its author claims. Scholars
of Australian literature may still focus on the issue of what is Australian in our
literature but for many years historians of Australian culture have explored the
relationship of local institutions and values to Europe and America. In that context
Dixon has added another dimension to our understanding of the process of transmission
rather than pioneering a new direction in the study of Australian popular culture.
I am also troubled by the method. No attempt is made to justify the texts selected
for discussion. At the same time the issue of audience and its response is more or less
sidestepped altogether. In writing of the narratives of Asiatic Invasion that featured
in Lone Hand Dixon suggests that it is 'difficult to gauge' whether the magazine
reflected or created public opinion although I suspect that he believes it was the
latter. As an historian of popular culture I am aware that the issue of audience(s) and
its response is an extremely problematic one but I am also certain that it is one that
must be addressed. Nevertheless, this is an extremely interesting, intelligently argued
and revealing study. The arguments developed here have important implications for
the history of Australian popular literature and culture.
Richard Waterhouse
Keith Tester, Media, Culture and Morality, London and New York:
Routledge, 1994.
Cultural studies is rotten at, if not to, the core. It is constitutionally incapable of
raising. never mind resolving, fundamental issues of aesthetic and moral value in its
chosen field of inquiry, popular culture. Such is Keith Tester's thesis which he
presents and argues for in his first chapter and develops in the rest of the book.
Throughout he pays close attention to many of the now standard texts in the area-in
astonishing detail considering the book's modest size-so that an incidental benefit
is that the uninitiated might emerge from their reading knowing much more than on
entering it.
Chapter One examines the theoretical position of cultural studies as this seminally
developed in England with the appropriation of Gramsci's notion of 'hegemony' and
the 'organic individual'. Tester claims here to expose two deficiencies, one more
fundamental than the other. The first, less grievous because remedial, involves what
he calls its 'silences'-its slipping by the nastier features of popular culture such as
racism just because the authors of the hegemony columns are sentimentally attached
to those at the rough end of the hegemonic relation. Being on side means excusing
rather than damning.
A drop of moral stiffener is all that is needed to fix up cultural studies' first fault,
so Tester thinks, although this could not penetrate to what he regards as its fundamental
defect. This, what he calls its 'blind spots' , he summarises in emphasising italics as
follows: 'Cultural studies can have no concept o/popular culture' (p.238). As only a
paragraph further on he makes what seems the contrary assertion that cultural studies
presupposes popular culture, that it takes it for granted, I take it that what he means is
that such investigations systematically ignore the aesthetic and moral content of 'the
people's culture' in favour of something quite different-its role as a field where
hegemonic relations sport or pleasures play.
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If this were just a standardised peccadillo of cultural studies then its blind spots
would just be long silences, its practitioners like eccentric 'bibliophiles' interested
solely in the physical weight of books. However, Tester is clear that there is something
about cultural studies' basic theoretical structure which renders it incapable of studying
the course in culture, much as if our 'bibliophiles' were mad physicalists whose
theory that primary qualities constitute the one reality implies the impossibility of
reading. It is not so much, then, that cultural studies has blind spots as that it has put
out its own eyes.
Unfortunately, Tester;s argument for this position is difficult to follow but I
think it is something like the following. Just 'where the people are at' culturally is 'in
front of television screens, reading newspapers or listening to music at home' (p.29)
and it is in 'locating' the people in this way-having thus to locate it in order to
identify it-that cultural studies necessarily presupposes the media. But then cultural
studies foregoes the possibility of aesthetic and moral criticism of the media it
presupposes because, having identified the audience that is watching, reading, listening,
etc., it takes the audience's responses as the only object of inquiry. This 'blindness'
of cultural studies to the content of popular culture it takes for granted is abetted by,
if it does not presuppose. its relativist definitions of 'culture' such as that of Tony
Bennett: 'culture consists of all those practices (or activities) that signify; that is,
which produce and communicate meanings by the manipulation of signs in socially
shared and conventionalized ways' (p.30). The study of signification, taken as solely
of 'meanings' boxed up in convention, avoids that of the significant.
Whatever Tester's argument is he seems at this point nicely set up to launch a
sorely needed detailed criticism of cultural studies. On the one hand, the whole sick
apparatus of cultural studies' 'presuppositions' could do with a vigorous shaking. In
particular, students should at least be informed of the arguments against the relaJivism
inherited from Gramsci's historicism and now laced with French varieties. On the
other hand, and as a sociologist Tester seems especially fitted for the task, the
phenomenon of cultural studies cries out for a critical investigation of how such a
reactionary movement so successfully.sells itself as progressive. These two critical
'hands' might be seen as joined to a body of genuine theory which seeks really to
understand things as they are.
But Tester does not undertake any of this work and, in fact, in conscience could
not because he shares cultural studies' disabling relativism. Thus sociology, which he
tries to promote as possibly a superior discipline for the study of culture, only provided
'narratives' with no facts of the matter deciding between them. This means that his
advocacy of Adorno's position comes down to a matter of taste or mere preference
for this or that feature of the rival theories other than their truth. Tester has deprived
himself of both armour and armament in his assault, emperor naked, on the fortress
of cultural studies from where charges of 'elitism', etc. are sure to be rained down on
him.
It is this relativism, embraced in its trappings of openness to rival theories, which
possibly explains a couple of otherwise curious and debilitating moves in Tester's
argument. Thus, in comparing Adorno's high-flying theory with David Morley's
mundane observations of television audiences, he asserts that 'though it is possible to
have approaches which either explain the audience or which describe the audience,
nevertheless it does not appear to be possible to have an approach which is capable of
both explaining and describing at one and the same time' (p.81). This is an odd thing
to assert, just like that, as if it needed no justification. Leaving aside questions
140
Reviews
concerning the assumption of a sharp dualism of the explanatory and the descriptive,
it is not generally the case that the two cannot be brought into useful relation. In
biology, for example, the theory of natural selection explains, and is open to
falsification by, the descriptions of living thins provided by natural history. In the
absence of an argument to the contrary, then, it is an open question whether Adorno's
(or some other) explanatory theory is confumed or falsified by Morley's descriptions
or whether they entirely miss each other because they are about quite different things
so that the truth or falsity of the one has no bearing at all on the other. I suspect the
'incommensurability' (p.82) arises for Tester, unsaid even to himself, not because of
the generality of theory as against the specificity of description but because of
something else-the clash, which Tester can treat only as a difference in taste, between
Adorno's aesthetic and moral realism and cultural studies' relativism in these respects.
The second oddity of Tester's work is his view that Adorno's cultural theory is
inconsistent because it has to regard the audience as both entirely passive in its
relation to the culture industry and as responding to that industry's intimations.
Stated thus barely the claim of inconsistency is open to the objection that it all
depends on what Adorno means by his reference to the passivity of the audience-
one and the same thing may be actively respondent in one respect while passive in
another. And it is surely clear that Adorno's claim is that the culture indUStry's
audience is passive in the respect that it is uncritically accepting (or rejecting) of the
products offered it. It passively absorbs 'Gladiators' while ever so actively munching
its sandwiches. Thus the position that 'the audience can only be made passive if it
responds to the media in a passive way' (p.66), as Tester puts it, is not consistent if
the 'passive' in 'passive way' is taken to mean 'unthinking' or 'uncritical' or some
such thing. The example Tester gives of audience response to the media (buying
television advertised products) suggests that he has fallen for cultural studies' catch-
all notion of culture as anything at all done by signifying humans. The realist idea of
culture as specifically concerned with the aesthetic is here quite lost (although, of
course, Tester retains it still somewhere at the back of his mind) and along with it the
connected notions of active critical appreciation as against passive acceptance.
Alan Olding
David J. Furley and Alexander Nehamas, eds, Aristotle's Rhetoric:
Philosophical Essays, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1994.
This volume presents papers selected from the twelfth Symposium Aristotelicum,
held at Princeton University in 1990. The contributors, all eminent classicists and
philosophers from Europe and America, include (among others) Myles Burnyeat,
Mary McCabe, Jilrgen Sprote, John Cooper, and Alexander Nehamas. The chief aim
of the Symposium, apart from addressing what it saw as deplorable neglect of
Aristotle's Rhetoric, was to situate the arguments and views of the Rhetoric in the
larger context of Aristotle's philosophy, and in so doing, to reveal its genuine
philosophical value. Accordingly, the essays in the book have been allotted to four
sections, each dealing with the relation of the Rhetoric to a different part of Aristotle's
philosophy: (I) The Arguments of the Rhetoric, (II) The Status of the Art of Rhetoric,
(Ill) Rhetoric, Ethics and Politics, and (IV) Rhetoric and Literary Art. The book is
supplied with an index locorom and an index nominum, but there is no general index.
Section one considers the relation of rhetoric to logic. What does Aristotle mean
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when he asserts that rhetoric is an 'offshoot' of dialectic? Does he have in mind a close
association between the Rhetoric and the Topics, the work in which Aristotle's theory
of dialectic is most thoroughly articulated? What is meant by saying that enthymeme
is the rhetorical counterpart of syllogism and that example is the counterpart of
induction? Does Aristotle mean to apply the formal structures and definitions of his
logic to rhetorical speeches or does he have a 'relaxed' standard for informal argument?
Toputit another way, isenthymeme a sort ofsyllogism (i.e. a syllogism with an unstated
but understood proposition) or a syllogism of a sort (i.e. an argument in some ways like
a syllogism, but where standards of deductive inference have been relaxed)? This
sectioncontains probably the bestessay ofthe volume, Burnyeat' s piece on enthymeme
and the logic of persuasion. Bumyeat sununons up extensive scholarship and consid-
erable philological talent to overtum the orthodox view, held since the time of the
conunentators, that enthymemes are incomplete syllogisms. In his view enthymemes
are the ideas or 'considerations' present in an orator's speech, and the argument based
on these considerations is not in the strict sense syllogistic (i.e. not deductive), it is just
more or less persuasive depending on the weight of the ideas. If this is right, it has
important implications. For Burnyeat will have shown that enthymeme and example
comprise a branch of Aristotle's logic that corresponds to probabilistic reasoning, or
reasoning from what is likely, and that would be a remarkable anticipation of some
contemporary epistemology.
The second section is concerned mainly with the legitimacy of rhetoric in the wake
of Plato's criticisms in the Gorgias and Phaedrus. Plato had argued that rhetoric was
not a true art, but consisted of flattery and a corresponding knack of producing
agreement. It was flattery, he thought, because it aimed at what was merely pleasant to
an audience and not, as a true art should, at what was good for them. It was only aknack
because it could produce no principles in virtue of which it secured agreement and
conviction. So there are two difficulties that face Aristotle here: the moral legitimacy
of rhetoric (is it ever right to enlist emotions to secure agreement?) and its technical
legitimacy (is rhetoric a systematic art, with a distinct subject matter and universal
principles?). Not much time is devoted to the question of technical legitimacy, though
Mary McCabe at least suggests that the principles of rhetoric are conunon principles;
they are the principles of argument generally. If so, rhetoric's technical legitimacy
depends crucially on how we understand the relation of enthymeme and example to
Aristotle's syllogistic. Of the several attempts to rescue Aristotle from the charge of
moral illegitimacy, Jiirgen Sprute's is the most provocative. Sprute refuses to discount
the various passages in which Aristotle shows a willingness to employ devices that are
morally questionable (e.g. tricks to persuade inattentive audiences, ways of recom-
mending an opinion whether it be true or false, instructions for deception and
exaggeration). Instead he argues that Aristotle's rhetoric is not idealistic but pragmatic,
aimed at political efficacy. For Aristotle even 'the most honest politician' must
sometimes use morally doubtful means to promote good ends. It seems unlikely that this
response would have satisfied Plato (or for that matter many other moral philosophers).
But apparently this was never Aristotle's aim because his political differences with
Plato were irreconcilable. The only thing Aristotle fails to do, Sprute maintains, is to
determine the limits of rhetorical pragmatism. Thus his defence of rhetoric remains
incomplete, though not unfounded.
Section three examines Aristotle's claim that rhetoric is, in addition to being an
offshoot of dialectic, also an offshoot of ethics and politics. The essays here are
concerned mainly with questions regarding the application of Aristotle's ethical theory
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in forensic rhetoric: What justifies appeals to emotion? What is the proper relation of
rhetoric to substantive ethical principles? In an illuminating paper John Cooper rightly
points out that according to Aristotle's moral psychology it is 'fully appropriate to feel
emotions as well as to have reasoned judgments concerning the sorts of value-laden
topics discoursed on by orators' (p.198). The value Aristotle allows to emotions in
ethics (virtue is impossible without feeling the right emotions in the right way and
amount) accounts for the general moral legitimacy of rhetoric. This is something that
Plato clearly failed to appreciate. It remains to ask what understanding orators are
required to have ofsubstantive ethical principles. Without some knowledge, the general
legitimacy of appeals to emotion amounts to little or nothing in specific cases. Cooper
argues that Aristotle relaxes Plato's requirement that orators have full philosophical
knowledge of these subjects: orators must attend to common beliefs (eruioxa) and their
grounds, and they must reflect, at least informally, on the opinions of those with a
reputation for intelligence on such matters. Unfortunately, Aristotle can be confident
that this appreciation of ethics will suffice only because he holds the dangerously
optimistic view that 'human beings are by nature pretty well oriented toward the truth
and more often than not succeed in reaching it' (Rhetoric 1355al4-18, Cooper's
translation).
The final section concerns the relation between Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics.
This section examines such topics as Aristotle's accounts of fear and pity and
Aristotle's theory of metaphor. In a departure from the approaches taken by the other
papers in this volume, Alexander Nehamas considers Aristotle's discussion of the
emotions in book II of the Rhetoric. He reaches the controversial conclusion that
Aristotle's discussion does not fit with our usual understanding of the Poetics. The lack
of fit is a result chiefly of the fact that the Rhetoric's account of emotion (particularly
fear and pity) is self-regarding-we fear through the prospect of our own suffering-
while the Poetics' account is sympathetic-we fear for the characters in a tragedy, not
for ourselves. There is thus 'a serious asymmetry between the way speeches affect and
channel the directly felt emotions of their listeners and the way fictions reform, if at all,
the emotions they generate in their audience' (p.272). This asymmetry prompts
Nehamas to reconsider the famous catharsis clause in Aristotle's definition of tragedy
in the Poetics, which states that tragedy deals with 'incidents involving pity and fear,
wherewith to accomplish its catharsis ofsuch emotions' (1449b28, Bywater's transla-
tion). In light of his examination of the Rhetoric, Nehamas concludes that catharsis
involves neither purgation nor homeopathic clarification of the emotions of a theatre
audience. In his view Aristotle is not speaking, in his definition of tragedy, of the
emotions (pathe) of the audience, but of the incidents (pathemata) of the tragic plot.
Nehamas maintains that the catharsis Aristotle speaks of is the 'resolution' of the tragic
plot, and that this resolution is reached only through incidents that themselves involve
pity and fear.
By considering the relation of rhetoric to logic, ethics and aesthetics, Aristotle's
Rhetoric aims to be philosophical thorough. But there is really not as much diversity in
this book as it would appear. Paper after paper zeroes in on the first four chapters of the
Rhetoric. The reader is subjected again and again to essentially similar discussions of
the following points: that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic (or ethics-wlitics), that
argument is more central to rhetoric than emotion or character, that human nature is
oriented towards the truth, that in court proceedings litigants should address only the
facts, that ethical-political eruioxa are starting points for rhetorical argument. Only the
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first section of the book is substantially distinct from the others (though even here, as
I pointed out, questions oflogic are central to the technical legitimacy ofrhetoric). Once
we get beyond Section I, the divisions of the book seem somewhat artificial. Virtually
all of the remaining papers deal significantly with Plato's criticisms of rhetoric and
Aristotle's response, and most of these only discuss Plato's views in the Gorgias and
Phaedrus. (In a welcome change of attention Eckart Schiltrumpfexamines the relation
of Aristotle's views to views about rhetoric expressed in Plato's Laws.)
There may be many explanations of this narrow focus, but one of them is surely that
after all there is not that much philosophy in the Rhetoric. And the reason why
philosophers have neglected Aristotle's Rhetoric probably has more to do with this than
with the editors' sweeping suggestion that Romanticism, which 'depended essentially
on denying any separation between form and content' (p.xi), is the culprit. Despite the
repetition, however, there is no reason to discount the individual achievements ofeach
author. These are all scholarly essays of exceptional quality. But in my view it is the
articles by Bumyeat, Cooper and Nehamas that really stand out. These alone are worth
the price of the volume.
Eugenio Benitez
T. J. Lustig, Henry Jame8 and the Ghoatly, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994.
From his earliest published tales to the novel he left unfinished at his death (The Sense
ofthe Past) Henry James was fascinated by the ghostly. The evidence is not only in tales
properly considered 'ghost stories', but also in intrusions of the eerie atmospherics of
the gothic in the major novels and in his penchant for the metaphorics of the uncanny.
The text for which he seems best known currently is that 'ghost story pure and simple',
The Tum ofthe Screw, and it is this which forms the centrepiece of Lustig's book and,
I would guess, its inspiration. Books which grow out of theses must work hard not to
betray their origins, and this one could have used some more rigorous editing. The
strength of the book is that it has a worthwhile thesis to argue: that the 'ghostly' in James
is 'intimately connected to the great dynamic forces that play through his work in its
entirety' . Its weakness is that the thesis drives the book into mechanical applications of
this 'dynamic' via somewhat desultory attempts to engage with a selection of theoreti-
cal positions and into a somewhat banal conclusion. Ontological uncertainty attracted
James, as Lustig is not the first to remark. Lustig's extension of the concept of the
ghostly to embrace Jamesian perceptual and conceptual teasings would, however, have
yielded more if Lustig had shown himself more continuously in touch with the real
mysteriousness of James's prose, that unique ability to evoke shadowy possibilities in
the transactions of the everyday and the domestic, that sense of absent presences, of
baffling ambiguities, that flower in the later James, the 'third manner' that caused his
famous brother William's famous outburst 'say it out, for God's sake, and have done
with it'.
A promising subject for a book, then, and for the first half Lustig sustains the
reader's attention, offering a solidly useful contextualising of notions of the ghostly,
of which a large defmition is advanced in terms not simply of the supernatural, but of
the haunted mind of James as 'an almost psychic sensitivity to shades'. James was
inclined to be self-deprecating about his ghost stories (Lustig argues that is because
they make explicit his debt to the sensational and the popular): he was not alone,
however, in his ghostly experiments. As Lustig points out there was hardly a major
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writer from 1850 to 1930 who did not share the fascination. The market for such
fictions was fed by post-Darwinian religious uncertainty and by the spread of
mesmerism and Spiritualism. James himself was familiar with the work of the Society
for Psychical Research, of which William was President from 1894-96. Intermittently
and not to me convincingly, Lustig attempts some hypotheses of a more personal
kind (the never explained 'obscure hurt', a sense of the loss and death of friends, his
troubled theatrical ventures) to account for James's interest in the ghostly.
The most useful contextualising is provided in the first chapter. where James's
sense of the need to justify recourse to the irrational and the supernatural is related to
the philosophical presuppositions of American romance as they descend from the
intellectual tradition that runs from Locke to Hartley. Much of the book's later
argument depends on this setting out of the ground, in which suspicion of the ghostly
is related to suspicion of rhetoric and metaphor in Plato, Hobbes, Locke. Socrates'
engagement with the uncanny, Derrida's and Ricoeur's view that it is impossible to
talk about metaphor non-metaphorically, leads Lustig to the conclusion that
'philosophy is haunted by what it seeks to exorcise'. This is the plank on which he
stands to advance his notion of 'the threshold', a liminal terrain between the canny
and the uncanny (Freud), the sayable and the unsayable (Burke's Sublime), 'romance'
and the novel (Scott), the everyday and the unfamiliar (English Romanticism, though
he doesn't quote Wordsworth's Preface to the Lyrical Ballads). This 'liminal' area is
seen as both space and process, indeed a rite of passage in Girard's notion of sacrificial
crisis. It is the threshold inhabited by Gothic literature, where 'words and images ...
grow radically unstable', and 'meaning is continually in question' .
Out of this, in turn, emerges Lustig's characterising of what he takes to he the
distinctively Jamesian 'dynamic'. If the ghost story strikes a balance between the
strange and familiar, abnormal and commonplace, supernatural and human
consciousness, James, he argues, is drawn to it by his own formative and enduring
balancings: between 'the developmental' and 'the anecdotal', between 'the air of
romance' and 'the element of reality', between the American and the European,
avoiding absolutes of difference and identity to fashion an interchange between 'the
explosive principle' and 'economic mastery'. That is, James endeavours to contain,
circumscribe, master the 'uncanny' by formal framing and ordering.
This is an unexceptionable (and unexceptional) account of a James who can
never be caught out in vulgar side-taking. Its usefulness must depend, however, on its
application to the individual works, and it is here that Lustig's book is disappointing,
especially when it ventures beyond the ghost stories proper into the major works.
That James's Europe reinvents the haunted castle of Gothic literature, as Leslie
Fiedler long ago pointed out, is most tellingly seen in The Portrait of a Lady, and I
have no quarrel with the sense of Lustig's somewhat mechanistic claim that 'a
deliteralised Gothic' ultimately provides an accurate description of Isabel Archer's
situation vis-a-vis the marriage to Osmond. But driven to produce a conclusion from
this dynamic, rather than allowing it to engage with the particularities of the text in a
way that might yield new readings, he breaks no new ground in the claim that Ralph
contradicts the James who collaborates with the sensitive protagonist (a familiar kind
of Jamesian ghosting) and Osmond the James who attempts to contain such imaginative
expressiveness by 'framing' it. While it is clear that 'strategies' of mastery and
'strategies' of containment are at play in the Jamesian text (is he any different then
from any other great writer in this regard?), the claims that 'the Osmond in James
kills off the Ralph but cannot prevent the latter's ghostly return' , or that 'it is through
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being trapped that Isabel acquires internal freedom' are flat and formulaic restatements
of what has been better expressed by other critics. On The Bostonians and The
Princess Casamassima Lustig is glancing and unconvincing. Yes, there are some
references to the spiritual, the spectral, the haunted, in these novels, but one would
need more convincing in order to see these as illuminating their distinctive
achievements.
Lustig is on his firmest ground in Chapter 3, which is devoted to The Tum of the
Screw. But it is an uneven and unwieldy chapter all the same, beginning in a properly
scbolarly survey of the proliferating criticism of this tale to reiterate the now familiar
outline of a manipulative text manipulating its critics by replicating the story's
constitutive dilemma, driving the reader towards an interpretative choice that reflects
bis own preconceptions. In this process Lustig himself is no exception, reading the
text as an interplay between the explosive possibilities of the ghostly and the economic
mastery of their containment by elaborate narrative framings. Where be does offer
new insight is in his perception of wbat the tale owes to, and how it transforms, the
early GabrieUe de Bergerac of 1869, and in his careful tracing of the fragmented
narrative and chronological sequences. His elaboration of the liminal in terms of
lacunae, doublings, oppositions, word play (the 'obs' and o's of the text, Bly'd =
belied) is sometimes close to self parody. The question of which way the figurative
screw 'turns' in this narrative yields the not surprising conclusion that for the governess
it can only turn 'centripetally', but for James it must turn 'both ways' in response to
the 'explosive' and the 'economic'. In a somewhat selective engagement with the
gender and power issues raised by the tale Lustig follows Gilbert and Gubar in seeing
James as repressing governesses and women in 'framing' the governess, though the
logic of his reading of the figure of the turn of the screw entails later recantation: 'If
pushed, I would therefore want to identify James with the hole in Flora's piece of
wood rather than the mast which, for Felman, insists on its status as signifier and
problematises all attempts to fix meaning' .
It is not always clear to me where the burden of narrative authority is seen to lie.
The tale's debt to Bronte [Jane Eyre] and Hawthorne [The Scarlet Letter] deserves
Lustig's consideration. But to see James's governess as seeking to become Jane Eyre
or taking on the role of her transgressive literary predecessor Hester Prynne stretches
the gbosting metaphor unproductively to blur what needs to be distinct the roles and
relationships of the narrators, including that of the authorial narrator himself.
There is a gathering sense that Lustig's thresholds and borderlines conspire in
such confusions. In painting James as 'the spectral spectator', 'the authorial other
within "tbe bouse of fiction'" , Lustig is led into associations between the Strether of
The Ambassadors for example, or Maggie in The Golden Bowl that strike me as at
best notional and at worst confused. Lustig seems unable fmally to decide whether
(following Frank Kermode) James is to be seen as entombed in his fictional bouse or
looking down from an aristocratic vantage point, as the revisitings of the late-written
Prefaces to the novels might suggest. Patterns of rbetoric inberent in Lustig's
fascination with the 'dynamic' begin to imprison Lustig himself in proliferating
neither/nor statements:
James represented himself through bis ghosts but these did not provide for a
self-enclosed and independent existence. Just as ghosts need buman beings to
see them, so writers need their readers. As a writer, James must take a similar
detour through others in order to come into being. Only by representing himself
as tbe other for others could he become a master, an occupant of the plains of
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heaven. To be such a master, however, was inevitably to posit oneself as
absent, as a being mediated by ghosts and texts. In a certain sense, the author
did not belong in life. (233)
If it's at all useful to think of the writer as the absent presence in his text, as
somehow displaced by narrative 'detours' and self-figurings, then James is surely no
different from other novelists of note. What needs to be shown are the gains or losses
inherent in such a notion of self-displacement as it might be reflected in James's
writing. Lustig's Postscript reads like afterthoughts on various theoretical perspectives
invoked earlier, (notably those of Girard, Todorov, Geunep, Turner), and its concluding
words, 'one simply cannot pin the man down. He is all these things and more', have
the effect of a throwing-up of the hands, a recognition that labelling formulations
thrown in the direction of the mystery of creative genius are liable to be sent back,
echoing hollowly.
Jennifer Gribble
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